Sargent called his latest venture Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics and tried to make connections with Simon's programme of bounded rationality and artificial intelligence. The irony is that rational expectations theory, born from the same mother-Carnegie-Mellon University-as bounded rationality, after trying to kill her big sister, then apparently came around to embracing her in the person of Sargent. But was Simon's interpretation of bounded rationality the same as Sargent's? Did Simon and Sargent mean the same by artificial intelligence? Not quite. The different interests of Sargent and Simon resulted in vastly different interpretations of bounded rationality and artificial intelligence.
Introduction
Reading the title of this paper you may wonder what Mr Rationality-Sargent-and Mr Bounded Rationality-Simon-could possibly have in common. However, rational expectations theory was born at the same time and in the same nest as bounded rationality: namely, in the 1960s at the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) at Carnegie-Mellon University.
1 Keynesians (Holt, an electrical engineer turned economist, and Modigliani), the prophet of bounded rationality (Simon) , the father of rational expectations (Muth, who started his career at Carnegie as a graduate student), and the popularisers of rational expectations (Lucas, Sargent, and Rapping) were all at Carnegie-Mellon University at some point during the 1960s. Simon (1991) noted that' [i] t is not without irony that bounded rationality and rational expectations, . . . though entirely antithetical to each other, were engendered in and flourished in the same small business school at almost the same time ' (p. 250 ; also see Simon, 1979, p. 486) .
Initially, the atmosphere among these adversaries was congenial. For example, Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (1960) collaborated on a 'Planning and Control of Industrial Operations' project that consisted of developing and applying mathematical techniques to business decision-making. Simon (1991) recalled that the 'four-man team . . . worked closely and amicably together for several years on a joint research research project mentioned before. According to Simon (1979) , ' Muth imaginatively saw in this special case a paradigm for rational behaviour under uncertainty. What to some of us in the Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon research team was an approximating, satisficing simplification, served for him as a major line of defence for perfect rationality ' (p. 486) . Simon (1991) argued that '[t] he theory of rational expectations offered a direct challenge to theories of bounded rationality" (p. 250). Moreover, 'Jack Muth, in his announcement of rational expectations in 1961, explicitly labelled his theory a reply to my doctrine of bounded rationality ' (pp. 270-71) . Simon (1991) wrote: 'Jack's proposal was at first not much noticed by the economics profession, but a decade later it caught the attention of a new young assistant professor at GSIA, Robert Lucas, who had just completed his doctorate at die University in Chicago. Beginning in 1971, Lucas and Tom Sargent, who was also with us for a short time, brought the theory of rational expectations into national and international prominence ' (p. 250) .
Not only was there a split between Simon and the neoclassical economists at Carnegie, but there was also antagonism widiin the neoclassical faction. Lucas recalled: 'Tom was at Carnegie for a while. That was his first job when he got out of Harvard. I didn't know him too well then. I'll tell you what happened in those days-it's ridiculous in retrospect. There was a kind of Chicago faction and a non-Chicago faction at Carnegie. Mike Lovell . . . was the non-Chicago leader . . . When Tom came, I associated him with the anti-Chicago group. I thought he didn't show interest in me. We didn't talk very much during the two years he was there' (Klamer, 1983, p. 33) .' Sargent remembered: 'I first met Lucas at Carnegie-Mellon, but I was way behind him ... I didn't talk to Lucas very much that year ... I remember when Lucas and Rapping were writing their paper. I used to talk to Leonard about it, not Bob' (Klamer, 1983, pp. 60-1) . Ironically, it was Mike Lovell who interested Sargent in rational expectations: 'I may mention that the one who put me onto rational expectations wasn't Bob Lucas; it was Mike Lovell . . . [Mike] put me onto the Muth article' (Klamer, 1983, p. 61) . Since Sargent was at Carnegie from 1968 until 1969, he did not overlap with Muth. He said: 'I don't really know [Muth] . I have met him two times. I've heard him give papers' (Klamer, 1983, p. 63) .
Jumping ahead in time, the irony of the relationship between rational expectations and bounded rationality goes on when rational expectations theory, born from the same mother as bounded rationality, after trying to kill her big sister, then tried to come around to embracing her in the person of called his latest venture Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics and tried to make connections to Simon's programme of bounded rationality and artificial intelligence (pp. 21-2). But was Simon's bounded rationality programme motivated by the same concerns as Sargent's? And did Simon and Sargent mean the same by artificial intelligence? Not quite. I shall argue that the different interests of Sargent and Simon resulted in vastly different interpretations of bounded rationality and artificial intelligence. 2 Sargent was interested in the conceptual integrity of dieory and method. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the theory he adopted was neoclassical theory and the method consisted of vector autoregressions. Hence, when he embraced bounded rationality, he tried to use it to strengthen neoclassical economics. When he adopted artificial intelligence, it implied a focus on adaptive computing and parallel processing. Simon, on the other hand, was interested in the formal foundations of rationality, in finding out how people made decisions. Hence, when he embraced bounded rationality, he tried to use it to reject the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics. When he adopted artificial intelligence, it implied a focus on symbol processing and serial computing.
Since Sargent and Simon disagreed from the beginning over what makes for good research in economics, they did not provide a common interpretation of ideas like bounded rationality and artificial intelligence. Embracing this complexity rather than shying away from it helps us get a deeper understanding and richer reading of their ideas. Consequently, I shall identify the stories Sargent and Simon told about bounded rationality and artificial intelligence in the light of their attitudes towards the standards to be used. The next section will take us through Sargent's side of the bounded rationality and artificial intelligence narrative. The third will give Simon's perspective.
Mr Rationality and adaptive computing
Interviews and publications evidence Sargent's interest in conceptual integrity of theory and method. He said: 'I tried to figure out the relationship between time-series and economic models. At the time I started the links weren't formal' (Klamer, 1983, p. 60) . 'This question about the relationship between theories and time-series has guided my studies. I try to learn both about theories and time-series econometrics with a purpose. I get particularly excited when I see possibilities of merging the two' (Klamer, 1983, p. 64) . Sargent (1987A) wrote: '[O]ne of the main substantive economic motivations of my own studies has been to understand the connections between economic theories and econometric tests of those theories' (p. xix).
Eventually, Sargent sought to find conceptual integrity by combining the theory of bounded rationality with the method of artificial intelligence. This may come as somewhat of a surprise, because Sargent was well known as one of the main characters in the rational expectations revolution. However, in many ways rational expectations turned out to be a dead end for Sargent. I shall restrict my attention to a few difficulties that appeared during the late 1970s and early 1980s in his work on rational expectations (for the complete story, see Sent, forthcoming) . On the econometric side of the conceptual integrity coin, he went with the flow and focused his attention on restricting vector autoregressions. Sargent (1981) justified this by an appeal to economic data: 'Since time series of economic data usually have the properties of high own-serial correlation and various patterns of cross-serial correlation, it seems that there is potential for [specifications] . . . that roughly reproduce the serial correlation and cross-serial correlation in a given collection of time series measuring market outcomes' (p. 215; also see Sargent, 1980, 1991B) .
As far as economic theory was concerned, Sargent jumped on Lucas's general equilibrium theory bandwagon, after spending a year as a visiting professor at the University of Chicago and taking two courses from Lucas (see Klamer, 1983, p. 62; Sargent, 1980, p. 107) . According to Sargent, 'Lucas pointed out that agents' decision rules . . . are predicted by [general equilibrium] economic theory to vary systematically with changes in the stochastic process facing agents' (Hansen and Sargent, 1980, p. 91) . This observation led Sargent (1981) to explore the implications 'of a single principle from economic theory. This principle is that people's observed behaviour will change when their constraints change ' (p. 214) . He restricted 'things so that the dynamic economic theory is of the equilibrium variety, with optimizing agents and cleared markets' (p. 214; also see Klamer, 1983, p. 68) . I should note that Sargent used the Lucas-Chicago approach to general equilibrium theory rather than the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie version.
To satisfy his interest in linking vector autoregressions and general equilibrium theory, Sargent availed himself of the concept of rational expectations, for '[Rational expectations modelling promised to tighten the link between theory and estimation, because the objects produced by the theorizing are exactly the objects in which econometrics is cast' (Hansen and Sargent, 199IB, p. 3) . Besides, 'Lucas and Prescott [had done] much to clarify the nature of rational expectations as an equilibrium concept, and also pointed the way to connecting the theory with observations' (Sargent, 1987C, p. 76; also see Sargent 1987C, p. 77) . Rational expectations modelling resulted in vector autoregressions: 'This is an attractive assumption because the solutions of such problems are known to imply that the chosen variables . . . can exhibit serial correlation and cross-serial correlation' (Sargent, 1981, p. 215) .
According to this interpretation, expectations were rational when they depended, in the proper way, on the same things that economic theory said actually determined that variable. A collection of agents was solving the same optimum problems by using the relevant economic theory and the solution of each agent was consistent with the solution of other agents. Econometric methods could then be used to estimate the vector autoregressions that resulted from this economic model. In this rendition of rational expectations, agents did not make any systematic errors because they were little economists and econometricians. According to , '[t] he idea of rational expectations is ... said to embody the idea that economists and the agents they are modelling should be placed on an equal footing: the agents in the model should be able to forecast and profit-maximize and utility-maximize as well as the economist-or should we say econometrician-who constructed the model' (p. 21; also see Sargent, 1987C, p. 76, 1987A, p. 440) . Or: 'The concept of a rational expectations competitive equilibrium . . . has the attractive property that. .. [the agents] in the model forecast. . . as well as the economist who is modelling them' (Sargent, 1987A, p. 411) .
Sargent really wanted everyone to be alike and had previously thought that one of the attractive properties of the concept of rational expectations was that there was symmetry among agents, economists, and econometricians. The trouble for Sargent was that he ended up with asymmetry between agents and econometricians when his decisions were further elaborated. It turned out that when implemented numerically or econometrically, rational expectations models imputed more knowledge to the agents within the model (who used the equilibrium probability distributions in evaluating their Euler equations) than was possessed by an econometrician, who faced estimation and inference problems that the agents in the model had somehow solved. The reason is that agents' decision rules are exact (non-stochastic) functions of the information they possess, while the econometrician must resort to some device to convert the exact equations delivered by economic theory into inexact (stochastic) equations susceptible to econometric analysis (see Sargent, 1993, p. 21; Hansen and Sargent, 1980, p. 93) . Because, '[d] espite its explicit recognition of uncertainty in modelling behaviour, [rational expectations] theory actually generates behavioral equations without residuals. As with most macroeconomic theory then, we must tack on residuals to obtain empirically usable models and the theory is silent about the nature of the residuals' (Sargent and Sims, 1977, p. 54) . Recalling that rational expectations economists and econometricians challenged adaptive expectations ones for fitting models that forecast better than agents, we now observe a reversal of the contested asymmetry. While the agents somehow knew what was going on, Sargent (1987A) was learning about it: '[M]y own process of learning the subject has continually mixed technical tools and economic models' (p. xix). Also: 'My published work is just a record of my learning . . . It's been a painful and slow process. My work is like a journey, a journey of discovery* (Klamer, 1983, p. 74) .
Another dead end was that the convenience to be found in engineering metaphors drove Sargent's further elaborations of the adoption of vector autoregressions, general equilibrium theory, and rational expectations and ended up as the mother of all rationality in his contributions: 'This paper describes methods for conveniently formulating and estimating dynamic linear econometric models under the hypothesis of rational expectations. An econometrically convenient formula for the cross-equation restrictions is derived' (Hansen and Sargent, 1980, p. 91 ; also see Hansen and Sargent, 1981A, pp. 127, 151, 1981B, p. 255, 1982 , pp. 269, 294, 1990 Lucas and Sargent, 1979, p. 13; Sargent, 1987A, p. 226, 1987B, p. 1) . This convenience led him from covariance, stationary, linearly indeterministic processes to Wold's decomposition theorem to moving average representations to autoregressive representations to Wiener-Kolmogorov linear least squares prediction to state-space representations to Kalman filtering to innovations representations (see Sent, 1996) . This convenience was the very opposite of an atemporal law-governed rationality. While alluding to the rationality of agents and optimality of outcomes, Sargent was driven to reduce everything to the weak expedient of convenience to justify his own work. Is this not the same as Simon's 'satisficing'? And how come agents get to escape these difficulties?
These dead ends eventually caused Sargent to try to restore symmetry among agents, economists, and econometricians by incorporating learning.
1 made a 'call to retreat from . . . rational expectations ... by expelling rational agents from our model environments' (p. 3) and 'to create theories with behavioral foundations by eliminating the asymmetry that rational expectations builds in between the agents in the model and the econometrician who is estimating it' (pp. 21-2; also see Sargent, 1993, p. 23) . However, he tried to reinforce rational expectations by focusing on convergence to this equilibrium: 'One reason for studying the [learning] problem is that the notion of a rational expectations equilibrium would be a more attractive one if there were plausible and undemanding learning schemes which would drive the system towards a rational expectations equilibrium' (Marcet and Sargent, 1992, p. 140 ; also see Marcet and Sargent, 1988 , p. 168, 1989A, p. 360, 1989B, p. 1306 , 1989C, p. 120, 1992 Sargent, 1993, p. 133) .
He also tried to use learning with adaptive expectations to deal with some of the 1 1 should note that Boland (1986) has argued that the problem with the rational expectations hypothesis is not that it lacks a theory of learning, but that it relies on a false theory of learning. For the rational expectations hypothesis to work, facts must not only speak for themselves but they must say the same thing to every individual. However, without a reliable inductive logic there is no reason to suspect that this will be the case. Similarly, Richardson (1959 Richardson ( , 1960 has noted the impossibility of forming rational expectations in a world of interdependent decisions. He emphasised the necessity of people believing different things if some kinds of economic incoherence are to be avoided. Since there is no room in this paper to elaborate on these issues, the reader is referred to Loasby (1989) for an evaluation.
problems associated with rational expectations. While '[rjational expectations models sometimes have too many equilibria' (Sargent, 1993, p. 25 ) 'the adaptive system selects an [equilibrium] path' (Sargent, 1993, p. 134 ; also see Marcet and Sargent, 1992 , p. 140, 1988 . While 'there are particular areas in which the outcomes that [rational expectations] predicts are sharp but very difficult to reconcile with observations' (Sargent, 1993, p. 25) , 'incorporating adaptive expectations would serve, at least temporarily, to modify or take the edge off very sharp predictions that arise in some rational expectations models' (Sargent, 1993, p. 134) . Furthermore, including learning would deal with some discrepancies in rational expectations, because '[d] espite the fact that they are inconsistent with rational expectations, . . . regime change experiments have been a principal use of rational expectations models in macroeconomics' (Sargent, 1993, p. 27) . Finally, incorporating learning could assist in the computation of equilibria, for 'either the least-squares learning scheme or the ordinary differential equation associated with it can suggest effective algorithms for computing a rational expectations equilibrium for applied work' (Marcet and Sargent, 1992, p. 161 ; also see Sargent, 1993, pp. 106, 152; Marcet and Sargent, 1988 , p. 171, 1989B, p. 1320 .
Once he moved to restore symmetry among agents, economists, and econometricians by incorporating learning, Sargent had to figure out what version of the learning assumption he wanted to use. Unfortunately, Marcet and Sargent's adaptive expectations approach resulted in a very limited interpretation of learning by the agents. They still had to be quite smart. Instead, Sargent sought an answer in bounded rationality in the form of artificial intelligence. appealed to the ideas of a 'number of economists [who] are answering this question by combing the recent literature on artificial intelligence as a source of methods and insights . . . Some of these methods embody sensible versions of at least aspects of what we might mean by "behave like a scientist'" (pp. 23-4). thought he could restore symmetry 'by expelling rational agents . . . and replacing them with "artificially intelligent" agents who behave like econometricians. These "econometricians" theorize, estimate, and adapt in attempting to learn about probability distributions which, under rational expectations, they already know 5 (p. 3). How did he come up with this move? became an enthusiast for the artificial intelligence approach to learning after attending a workshop for economists and physicists at the Santa Fe Institute: 'My interest in studying economies with 'artificially intelligent' agents was spurred by attending a meeting ... at the Santa Fe Institute in September 1987' (p. vi). Moreover, he left his subgroup on webs with some suggestions about how to deal with some of the classical problems in economics, in particular in the two-nation overlapping generations model, by replacing agents that have perfect foresight with adaptive, rule-based agents who learn.
Out of the several approaches to artificial intelligence, such as symbol processing in digital computers, adaptive computing systems, and expert systems, Sargent chose classifier systems and genetic algorithms, after learning about them from John Holland at Santa Fe: 'Our agents are artificially intelligent and are modelled as using classifier systems to make decisions' (Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent, 1990, p. 329 ; also see Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent, 1990, pp. 329-30) . He saw the 'literature on genetic algorithms [as] a good source of ideas on how to proceed' (Marcet and Sargent, 1992, p. 162) . John Holland had suggested applying classifiers to economics by finding an established model that 'should be easily extendible in several dimensions so that even more realistic situations can be studied. In [Holland's] opinion, the two-nation overlapping generations model (see the discussion in [Hansen and] Sargent) goes a long way toward meeting these criteria' (Holland, 1988, p. 123; see Hansen and Sargent, 1981 A) . This model could be modified by using classifier systems and compared with the standard equilibrium solutions that required agents with perfect one-step foresight.
Classifier systems were part of what could be called the adaptive computing approach to artificial intelligence, along with neural networks and connectionist systems (see Anderson, Arrow, and Pines, 1988; Holland and Miller, 1991; Lane, 1993A, 1993B; Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent, 1990, p. 330; Waldrop, 1992) . They were parallel, message-passing, rule-based systems, that modelled their environments by activating appropriate clusters of rules. They were able to model complicated, changing environments, to interpret the internal states of agents in the theory so that the agents seemed progressively to 'model' their world, to make agents able to build up behavioural repertoires that included chains of actions initiated long before the agent obtains the reward, and to make agents able to develop the capacity to plan future actions on the basis of their expectations of what the consequences of those actions will be. Classifier systems had two particularly desirable efficiency properties. First, they did not impose heavy memory requirements on the system. Second, much of the information processing could be carried out in parallel. Very convenient, indeed.
How could these classifier systems be applied to economics? Instead of assuming that agents were perfectly rational, they could be modelled with classifier systems and learn from experience like real economic agents. Instead of modelling the economy as a Lucas-Chicago general equilibrium, societies of classifier systems could organise a set of interacting economic agents into an economy. Reluctant to give up ideas like representative agents or completed arbitrage and to renounce Lucas-Chicago general equilibrium analysis, Sargent did not go all the way with Santa Fe. Rather than using classifier systems to think about populations, he saw them as models of the neurons of an individual's brain (see Sargent, 1993, p. 76) . Rather than relinquishing the notion of an equilibrium, he focused on convergence to equilibrium (see Sargent, 1993, p. 153; Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent, 1990, p. 372) . This is where Simon enters the story. In an interview in 1982, Sargent responded to Simon's criticism of the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics in the following way: 'People who take that criticism seriously end up ... doing more difficult rational expectations. It remains to be seen whether Simon's criticism is constructive or useful in the sense that I defined earlier, namely that someone builds on it ... The general principle here is that the less information and the harder the choice problem of agents, the more learning you load in, the more difficult is the problem to analyze and to solve. The art is in keeping a model that captures some elements of these things, but is still tractable' (Klamer, 1983, p. 79) .
However, after having encountered numerous dead ends in the attempt to serve his interest in conceptual integrity of theory and method through the use of general equilibrium theory, vector autoregressions, and rational expectations, Sargent published Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics in 1993 and tried to make connections to Simon's programme of bounded rationality and artificial intelligence: 'Herbert Simon and other advocates of "bounded rationality" propose to create theories with behavioral foundations by eliminating the asymmetry that rational expectations builds in between the agents in the model and the econometrician who is estimating it' (pp. 21-2). At about the same time, Simon (1991) 
Mr Bounded Rationality and symbol processing
Dismayed by the developments at the GSIA at Carnegie-Mellon University during the 1960s, Simon took refuge in the psychology department. Simon (1991) claimed that the disputes that had started at the GSIA 'undoubtedly contributed to the gradual escalation of my conflict with the profession' (p. 271). The disputes were about the assumption of rational agents. Simon's interpretation of bounded rationality was different from Sargent's, since it was shaped by different interests. Simon (1991) wrote in his autobiography: 'Actually, to say that I retreated from the Graduate School of Industrial Administration in only partly correct; I was also drawn to the Psychology Department and the burgeoning new activity around the computer by the shift in my own research interests' (p. 251). 'The Psychology Department provided the platform for launching the cognitive revolution in psychology. A sequence of organizations, culminating in the Computer Science Department, provided the corresponding platform for artificial intelligence' (p. 252). Starting off in political science and then moving through several disciplinary domains, such as management theory, economics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science, whole academic career has been focused on one problem: a search for 'a science of man' based on 'his dual nature as a social and a rational animal' (p. vii). Simon was interested in finding out how people made decisions and was driven by the conviction that neoclassical economists were not all that serious about describing the formal foundations of rationality, whereas he was.
Contrary to Sargent, Simon (1991) embraced 'a logical positivism' that he has 'never relinquished' (p. 44; also see Simon, 1975, p. 45) . This has been the source of much criticism of Simon's (1991) work: 'It is true that I am still accused of "positivism" as though that were some kind of felony, or at least a venial sin' (p. 270; also see Simon, 1991, p. 85) . It also caused Simon (1991) to criticise the rational expectations programme of Muth: 'Jack published in Econometrica in 1961 a novel suggestion for handling uncertainty in economics. He clearly deserves a Nobel for it, even thought I do not think it describes the real world correctly. Sometimes an idea that is not literally correct can have great scientific importance' (pp. 249-50; also see Simon, 1981, p. 47) . But Simon was after ideas that were literally correct. For example, criticised organisational theory for 'superficiality, oversimplification, lack of realism' (p. 38). He even tried to recruit rational expectations economists in his logical positivist camp. claimed that the 'faith in a priori theory, uncontaminated by empirical observations, has been weakened-even among "rational expectationists". More and more economists are beginning to look for the facts they need in actual observation of business decision-making and in laboratory experiments on economic markets and organizations' (p. 7). While Sargent's work is hard to capture because he kept changing his interpretation of rational expectations to the point of trying to argue that it was closely linked to bounded rationality, Simon's research is hard to summarise because he has done so much work in so many different disciplines. However, the concepts he developed originally in management science carried over to his research in economics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. Simon's positivist conviction that an understanding of rationality should be practical caused him to link management science to decisionmaking, decision-making to problem-solving, and problem-solving to artificial intelligence and economics. For Simon, both artificial intelligence and economics were about describing how people selected a satisfactory option from a set of alternatives.
Simon's search for how people actually made decisions started from the conviction that there were external, social constraints and internal, cognitive limitations to decision-making.
1 This led him to focus on the process rather than the outcome of decision-making. According to , when we are 'concerned with the limits of rationality', we need to focus on 'the manner in which organization affects these limits for the person making a decision' (p. 241). Awareness of these constraints, for Simon (1966) , caused people to use heuristics and satisfice: 'Satisficing heuristics are widely applicable and widely applied in problem domains where the number of possible solutions is far too great to permit exhaustive search and where an efficient maximizing algorithm is not available' (p. 281). Loosely articulated heuristics, or rules of thumb, Simon argued, governed the process of gathering information and choosing alternatives. According to Simon, these heuristics were employed generally because they had been proved successful in the past. Furthermore, they implied that the decision-maker was searching merely for an adequate solution. In Simon's (1992) view, '[t] he selectivity of the search, hence its feasibility, is obtained by applying rules of thumb, or heuristics, to determine what paths should be traced and what ones can be ignored. The search halts when a satisfactory solution has been found, almost always long before all alternatives have been examined' (p. 4; also see Simon, , pp. 21-34, 1976 Simon, , p. 431, 1978A, p. 455, 1978B, p. 462, 1981 . That is, people satisficed, they accepted the first solution that was satisfactory according to a set of minimal criteria. 'Most human decision-making,' Simon claimed, 'whether individual or organizational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives' (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 140-1 ; also see Simon, 1955 Simon, , pp. 252-3, 1956 Simon, , p. 261, 1957A, pp. 204-5, 1976 Simon, , pp. 433, 435, 1978A, pp. 444, 453, 455, 1979 Simon, , pp. 476, 479, 483-4, 489-90, 1981 . The minimal criteria to be used were laid down in goals that could be divided into independent sub-goals (sub-tasks). For Simon, '[a]ction is goal-oriented and adaptive ' (March and Simon, 1958, p. 169) . This, then, allowed a problem to be broken down into sub-problems and, for , implied 'a hierarchy of decisions-each step downward in the hierarchy consisting in an implementation of the goals set forth in the step immediately above' (p. 5; also see March and Simon, 1958, pp. 151-4; Simon, 1981, pp. 51-2) . Now that we have a general taste of the flavour of Simon's work on bounded rationality, we may wonder how he saw it in relation to rational expectations. Given his interest in finding out how people made decisions, Simon saw rational expectations and bounded rationality as being opposed to each other. He believed that the neoclassical orthodoxy gave too little attention to institutional constraints on economic behaviour and cognitive constraints on individual decisions. According to Simon (1987B) , '[t] he term "bounded rationality" is used to designate rational choice that takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker-limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity' (p. 266). And, for Simon (1991) expectations offered a direct challenge to theories of bounded rationality, for it assumed a rationality in economic actors beyond any limits that had previously been considered even in neoclassical theory 5 (p. 250). Simon (1987A) argued diat the 'term "bounded rationality" has been proposed to denote the whole range of limitations on human knowledge and human computation that prevent economic actors in the real world from behaving in ways that approximate die predictions of classical and neoclassical theory: including die absence of a complete and consistent utility function for ordering all possible choices, inability to generate more than a small fraction of the potentially relevant alternatives, and inability to foresee the consequences of choosing the alternatives ' (p. 222) .
Did the two opposing poles of Simon's bounded rationality and Sargent's rational expectations meet again in Sargent's latest venture? Not really, for instead of using bounded rationality like Sargent to try to strengthen the concept of rational expectations, Simon pointed out in his dieory of bounded rationality why the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics did not always work in practice. foresaw difficulties along diree steps of the way to a decision: '(1) die listing of all die alternative strategies; (2) die determination of all the consequences that follow upon each of diese strategies; (3) the comparative evaluation of tiiese sets of consequences' (p. 67). According to , 'die subject, in order to perform with perfect rationality in diis scheme, would have to have a complete description of die consequences following each alternative strategy and would have to compare these consequences. He would have to know in every single respect how the world would be changed by his behaving one way instead of anodier, and he would have to follow die consequences of behavior dirough unlimited stretches of time, unlimited reaches of space, and unlimited sets of values' (p. 69). Hence, Simon's bounded rationality differed in diree important respects from Sargent's rational expectations.
First, instead of assuming a fixed set of alternatives, among which die decision-maker chose, Simon's tiieory of bounded rationality postulated a process for generating alternatives. Appealing to studies in modern cognitive psychology on die processes diat human subjects used to choose among given alternatives and to find possible courses of action, Simon argued diat under most circumstances it was not reasonable to talk about finding 'all die alternatives'. The generation and evaluation of alternatives was a lengdiy and cosdy process, and one where, in real-world situations, even minimal completeness could seldom be guaranteed. Second, Simon detected anodier weakness associated widi die basic assumptions of neoclassical economics in die fact diat individuals had difficulty coming up widi original solutions to problems. Cognitive limits-lack of knowledge and limits of ability to forecast the future-played a central role in die evaluation of alternatives. These cognitive limits were not simply limits on specific information. They were almost always also limits on die adequacy of scientific dieories diat could be used to predict the relevant phenomena. Such observations led Simon to speculate diat die mind mosdy functions by applying approximate or cookbook solutions to problems. Finally, instead of assuming die maximisation of a utility function, Simon's bounded rationality dieory postulated a satisficing strategy. It sought to identify, in dieory and in actual behaviour, procedures for choosing diat were computationally simpler, and argued that individuals picked die first choice diat met a pre-set acceptance criterion. Simon (1978B) concluded diat 'neoclassical dieory, even widi die help of "rational expectations" (more accurately described as "consistent expectations"), is far from adequate to die needs of policy" (p. 471; also see Simon, 1976 , E.-M. Sent pp. 437-8, 1978A, pp. 445, 453, 1979 Sent pp. 437-8, 1978A, pp. 445, 453, , pp. 485-6, 1981 .
All right, so Sargent did not quite come around to embracing Simon's interpretation of bounded rationality. But what about Simon's analysis of artificial intelligence? Again, Simon's interest in finding out how people made decisions shaped an interpretation of artificial intelligence that was vastly different from Sargent's allusions to parallel processing and adaptive computing. The concepts Simon developed in bounded rationality served as a springboard for his interpretation of artificial intelligence. Simon's bounded rationality programme, though contrary to rational expectations theory, offered an open window into the workings of the human mind. The same ideas of 'heuristic' or 'rulebound' search, 'satisficing' behaviour, and 'goal, sub-goal' strategy that shaped Simon's theory of bounded rationality also became key concepts in his problem-space approach to reproducing human-style reasoning (see, e.g., Kadane and Simon, 1975; Newell and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1966 Simon, , pp. 276-81, 1967A, 1972 Simon, , 1981 ).
Simon's bounded rationality programme embodied ideas for programming a computer how to think. An understanding of the 'real' processes at work behind human decision-making allowed Simon to build computers that replicated these processes and to serve his interest in finding out how people made decisions. The notions of heuristics and sub-problems suggested that machines could be programmed to solve problems without specifying the solution for every problem in detail and that tasks could be divided into independent, hierarchically ordered sub-tasks. They allowed the development of simple problem-solving procedures for computers. 'In solving problems, wrote, 'human thinking is governed by programs that organize myriads of simple information processes-or symbolic manipulating processes if you like-into orderly, complex sequences that are responsive to and adaptive to the task environment and the clues that are extracted from that environment as sequences unfold' (p. 81).
To serve his interests, Simon developed a so-called physical symbol system hypothesis. According to this presupposition, the necessary and sufficient condition for a system to be capable of thinking-doing those things that, if they were done by a human being, we would call thinking-was that it be able to perform symbolic processes. The two main processes predominating this theory of thinking were problem-solving by heuristic search and problem-solving by recognition. This involved: (1) putting symbols in; (2) putting symbols out; (3) storing symbols and relational structures of symbols; (4) constructing, modifying, and erasing such symbol structures; (5) comparing two symbol structures; and (6) following one course of action or another, depending on the outcome of such a comparison. The result was a step-by-step mental search through a vast 'problem space' of possibilities, with each step guided by a heuristic rule of thumb: 'If this is the situation, then that step is worth taking.' If the hypothesis was true, several consequences followed. First, computers, appropriately programmed, then were capable of thinking. Second, the human brain, since it was capable of thinking, was (at least) a physical symbol system.
Simon's interests, therefore, shaped an interpretation of artificial intelligence that was distinctly different from that of Sargent. Rather than focusing on neuronal structures as Sargent had done, Simon analysed the architecture of the mind at the symbolic level without a theory of how these symbolic processes were implemented by neuronal structures. Simon (1993) wanted 'to characterize most of the higher-level and complex cognitive phenomena at the symbol level, rather than attempting to describe it all solely in neurological terms ' (p. 644) . Rather than analysing the brain as a predominantly parallel device like Sargent, Simon settled on a serial system. Simon (1993) dismissed the conclusion that the brain was predominantly a parallel device, and that for this reason a serial computer could not simulate a brain process, by arguing that this conclusion did not take into account the fact that the details of neuronal implementation were largely independent of the theory of the mind's symbol structures and symbol processes: 'Even extensive parallel processing at the neural level would not imply parallelism at the symbolic level' (p. 644).
Hence, Simon tried to satisfy his interest in finding out how people actually made decisions by constructing a theory of the architecture of the mind and the characteristics of that architecture at the symbolic level, even in the absence of any but a very incomplete and primitive theory of how these symbolic processes were implemented by neuronal structures. Because '[t] hose efforts that undertake to introduce "neurons" possessing relatively realistic biological properties have been limited largely to simple, low-level structures containing few neurons, hence cannot yet be linked in any clear way to models or phenomena at the symbolic level. On the other hand the "neurons" of connectionist models are more numerous, but they have few of the properties of real neurons, and provide a foundation for only very abstract models of thought processes. Moreover, it has not yet been demonstrated that they can account for any wide range of complex cognitive performances in the domains of problem solving, use of language, or reasoning' (Simon, 1993, p. 645) . Simon (1993) concluded that 'it is improbable that [connectionist nets or neural networks] will supersede models of the more traditional serial kind as explanations of behaviour at the symbolic level' (pp. 645-6).
Conclusion
Motivated by achieving what he would regard as conceptual integrity of theory and method, Sargent initially focused on vector autoregressions, general equilibrium theory, and rational expectations in the late 1970s. Asymmetry between agents and econometricians followed as one of the dead ends, since, while econometricians were learning, agents were supposed to know what was going on. Furthermore, while convenience drove him in his own work, the agents were supposed to be rational and the outcome was considered to be optimal. Sargent sought to restore conceptual integrity of theory and method by adopting artificial intelligence and bounded rationality.
Sargent tried to link his interpretations of bounded rationality and artificial intelligence with those of Simon. This link turned out to be rather weak. Since Sargent wanted to restore symmetry by incorporating learning, he embraced neoclassical theory and parallel adaptive computing systems. At the same time, Simon's interest in human decision-making and the foundations of rationality made him move to the serial symbol processing approach. As a result, he dismissed neoclassical theory and parallel systems. Instead, his interests revealed the structural similarities of his serial symbol processing programme and the 'bounded' alternative to neoclassical choice theory. Searching, rule-bound decisions, goal-oriented behaviour-most of the basic ideas of Simon's bounded rationality theory-were carried over to his interpretation of artificial intelligence.
The point is that important arguments in economics are so rarely joined because the disagreements stem from root-and-branch differences of interests. Ideas do not hinge on a set of contested facts about the world. At issue is what individual economists
